Spring 1998 | Triton College |
PHL103 Ethics | Dr. John Wager |
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SECTION I
. . . There has been a controversy started of late, much better worth
examination concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether they be
derived from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge of
them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an im-mediate feeling and
finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgement of truth and
falsehood, they should be the same to every rational intelligent being; or
whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded
entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species.
On the other hand, those who would resolve all moral determinations into
sentiment, may endeavour to show, that it is impossible for reason ever to
draw conclusions of this nature. To virtue, say they, it belongs to be
amiable, and vice odious. This forms their very nature or essence. But can
reason or argumentation distribute these different epi-thets to any
subjects, and pronounce beforehand, that this must produce love, and that
hatred? Or what other reason can we ever assign for these affections, butthe original fabric and formation of the human mind, which is naturally
adapted to receive them?
A generous, a brave, a noble deed, performed by an adversary, commands
our approbation; while in its consequences it may be acknowledged prejudicial to our particular interest.
Self-love is a principle in human nature of such extensive energy, and the
interest of each individual is, in general, so closely connected with that
of the community, that those philosophers were excusable, who fancied that
all our concern for the public might he resolved into a concern for our own
happiness and preservation. They saw every moment, instances of approbation
or blame, satisfaction or displeasure towards characters and actions; they
denominated the objects of these sentiments, virtues, or vices; they
observed, that the former had a tendency to increase the happiness, and the
latter the misery of mankind; they asked, whether it were possible that we
could have any gen-eral concern for society, or any disinterested resentment of the welfare or injury of others; they found it simpler to consider
all these sentiments as modifications of self-love; and they discovered a
pretence, at least, for this unity of principle, in that close union of
interest, which is so observable between the public and each individual.
But notwithstanding this frequent confusion of interests, it is easy to
attain what natural philosophers, after Lord Bacon, have affected to call
the experimentum crucis, or that experiment which points out the right way
in any doubt or ambiguity. We have found instances, in which private
interest was separate from public; in which it was even contrary: And yet
we observed the moral sentiment to continue, notwithstanding this disjunction of interests. And wherever these distinct interests sensibly
concurred, we always found a sensible increase of the sentiment, and a more
warm affection to virtue, and detestation of vice, or what we properly call
gratitude and revenge. Compelled by these instances, we must renounce thetheory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love. We must adopt a more public affection, and allow, that the interests
of society are not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us.
Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and it is a contradiction
in terms, that anything pleases as means to an end, where the end itself no
wise affects us. If usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment,
and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self;
it follows, that everything, which contributes to the happiness of society,
recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a
principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And
what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one so
obvious and natural?
Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force of humanity and benevolence?
Or to conceive, that the very aspect of happiness, joy, prosperity, gives
pleasure; that of pain, suffering, sorrow, communicates uneasiness? The
human countenance, says Horace, borrows smiles or tears from the human
countenance. Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all enjoyment,
except either of the sensual or speculative kind; and that because the
movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent movements in his
fellow creatures. The signs of sorrow and mourning, though arbitrary,
affect us with melancholy; but the natural symptoms, tears and cries and
groans, never fail to infuse compassion and uneasiness. And if the effects
of misery touch us in so lively a manner; can we be supposed altogether
insensible or indifferent towards its causes; when a malicious or treacherous character and behaviour are presented to us?
It may justly appear surprising that any man in so late an age, should kind it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning,
that Personal Merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or
to others. It might be expected that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude unpractised enquirers
concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence, without any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any
kind, so naturally classes itself under the division of useful or agreeable, the utile or the dulce, that it is not easy to
imagine why we should ever seek further, or consider the question as a matter of nice research or inquiry. And as every thing
useful or agreeable must possess these qualities with regard either to the person himself or to others, the complete
delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is
reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and uneven; nor the surface from which the
image is reflected, disturbed and confused; a just figure is immediately presented, without any art or attention. And it
seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory, so
simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate examination. But however the case may have fared with
philosophy, in common life these principles are still implicitly maintained; nor is any other topic of praise or blame ever
recurred to, when we employ any panegyric or satire, any applause or censure of human action and behaviour. If we observe
men, in every intercourse of business or pleasure, in every discourse and conversation, we shall find them nowhere, except in
the schools, at any loss upon this subject. What so natural, for instance, as the following dialogue? You are very happy, weshall suppose one to say, addressing himself to another, that you have given our daughter to Cleanthes. He is a man of
honour and humanity. Every one, who has any intercourse with him, is sure of fair and kind treatment. I congratulate you
too, says another, on the promising expectations of this son-in-law; whose assiduous application to the study of the laws,
whose quick penetration and early knowledge both of men and business, prognosticate the greatest honours and advancement.
You surprise me, replies a third, when you talk of Cleanthes as a man of business and application. I met him lately in a
circle of the gayest company, and he was the very life and soul of our conversation: so much wit with good manners; so much
gallantry without affectation; so much ingenious knowledge so genteelly delivered, I have never before observed in any one.
You would admire him still more, says a fourth, if you knew him more familiarly. That cheerfulness, which you might remark in
him, is not a sudden flash struck out by company: it runs through the whole tenor of his life, and preserves a perpetual
serenity on his countenance, and tranquillity in his soul. He has met with severe trials, misfortunes as well as dangers; and
by his greatness of mind, was still superior to all of them. The image, gentlemen, which you have here delineated of
Cleanthes, cried I, is that of accomplished merit. Each of you has given a stroke of the pencil to his figure; and you have
unawares exceeded all the pictures drawn by Gratian or Castiglione. A philosopher might select this character as a model of
perfect virtue.Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all passions vulgarly, though improperly, comprised under the denomination of
self-love, are here excluded from our theory; concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too weak, but because
they have not a proper direction for that purpose. The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which
recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision
concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the
actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they agree or
disagree with that rule of right which is established. These two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of
humanity here insisted on. The other passions produce in every breast, many strong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but these neither are felt so much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as to be the foundation of any
general system and established theory of blame or approbation.
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the language of
self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation. But
when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and expresses
sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and
particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal principle of
the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If he mean, therefore, to express that
this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chosen this common point of view, and has
touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the
same elements as at present, it will never be wholly indifferent to public good, nor entirely unaffected with the tendency of
characters and manners. And though this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as vanity: or ambition,
yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any general system of blame or praise. One
man's ambition is not another's ambition, nor will the same event or object satisfy both; but the humanity of one man is the
humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures.
But the sentiments, which arise from humanity, are not only the same in all human creatures, and produce the same approbation
or censure; but they also comprehend all human creatures; nor is there any one whose conduct or character is not, by their
means, an object to every one of censure or approbation. On the contrary, those other passions, commonly denominated selfish,
both produce different sentiments in each individual, according to his particular situation; and also contemplate the greater
part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern. Whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity;
whoever expresses contempt mortifies and displeases me; but as my name is known but to a small part of mankind, there are few
who come within the sphere of this passion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or disgust. But if you represent a
tyrannical, insolent, or barbarous behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world, I soon carry my eye to the
pernicious tendency of such a conduct, and feel the sentiment of repugnance and displeasure towards it. No character can be
so remote as to be, in this light, wholly indifferent to me. What is beneficial to society or to the person himself must
still be preferred. And every quality or action, of even human being, must, by this means, be ranked under some class or
denomination, expressive of general censure or applause.
What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish the sentiments, dependent on humanity, from those connected with any other
passion, or to satisfy us, why the former are the origin of morals, not the latter? Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by
touching my humanity, procures also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in them; but what serves my
avarice or ambition pleases these passions in me alone, and affects not the avarice and ambition of the rest of mankind.
There is no circumstance of conduct in any man, provided it have a beneficial tendency, that is not agreeable to my humanity,
however remote the person; but every man, so far removed as neither to cross nor serve my avarice and ambition, is regarded
as wholly indifferent by those passions. The distinction, therefore, between these species of sentiment being so great and
evident, language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to express those universal
sentiments of censure or approbation, which arise from humanity or from views of general usefulness and its contrary. Virtue
and vice become then known; morals are recognized; certain general ideas are framed of human conduct and behaviour; such
measures are expected from men in such situations. This action is determined to be conformable to our abstract rule; that
other, contrary. And by such universal principles are the particular sentiments of self-love frequently controlled and
limited.
. . . .Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are
easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and
virtue. The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature, without
addition or diminution: the other has a productive faculty, and gilding or
staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal
sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool and
disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received
from appetite or inclination by showing us the means of attaining happiness
or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby
constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the
first spring or impulse to desire and volition. From circumstances and
relations, known or supposed, the former leads us to the discovery of the
concealed and unknown: after all circumstances and relations are laid
before us, the latter makes us feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame
or approbation.