McClellan
“…there
is an indefinable air of success about him and something of the man of
destiny.”
“I find
myself in a strange position here: President, Cabinet, Genl. Scott & all
deferring to me. By some strange
operation of magic I seem to have become the power of the land.”
McClellan
McClellan
Democrats pleaded with him
Save the Union
From the
rebellion
From
Lincoln “…letter after letter-conversation after conversation calling on me to
save the nation-alluding to the Presidency, Dictatorship etc.”
Primary task
Renew the Union Army in the east
Showed
unflagging energy
18 hour
days
Constantly
in the saddle
McClellan
“Mac” vs Scott
Communicated directly with Lincoln, bypassing Scott
Lincoln did the same
McClellan complained that the “old General” was
frustrating his plans to train and expand the Army
“I do
not know if he is a dotard or a traitor…if he cannot be taken out of my path, I
will resign…”
Lincoln, bowing to political pressure allowed Scott to
resign 1 November1861
McClellan
Mac’s work with the Army was remarkable
Reorganization
Accountability
Sanitation
Supply
Training
Strategic thought flawed
Places
Strength of enemy
Reality of recruiting and supply
McClellan
Feverish
pace started to wear physically/mentally
Became
convinced that the South had 100,000 men in N.Va. And were intent on invasion
Actually
they had ½ that number and had no plans to invade
By fall
Mac’s army was 70,000
In his
mind the South had 130,000
McClellan
Lincoln wanted the army to move
Mac had little patience for Lincoln
Saw him as a person of inferior abilities
An oaf
Hostile
Incapable of understanding the military art
Lincoln was patient
Defended his inaction in the fall of ’61
Counseled him about the military in a republic
McClellan
With
Scott’s retirement McClellan becomes General-in-Chief as well as field
commander in the East
“I can
do it all.”
Resented
any interference
Especially
by Lincoln
Democrats
started to “feel out” McClellan as a possible candidate
McClellan
Consistently
overestimated enemy size
October
1861
U.S.=120,000
in and around Washington
C.S.A.=45,000
in and around Manassas
McClellan’s
estimate of enemy 150,000
Preparing
to attack
September
“Quaker
Guns”
McClellan
The
Wedding Party
“I will
hold McClellan’s horse if he will only bring us success.”
“Bull
Run Syndrome”
Army
never ready
Fear of
risk
Chance
of failure
McClellan
had never known failure
McClellan
“The enemy have from 3 to 4 times my force-the Presdt. is
an idiot…cannot or will not see the true state of affairs.”
Lincoln 27 January
General War Order #1
22
February
General movement of U.S. forces against enemy
McClellan’s plan for Urbana vetoed by Lincoln
Directs McClellan to move army SW of Manassas on the RR
line
McClellan
McClellan asks for reconsideration
Lincoln:If you can answer these questions to my
satisfaction, I will yield my plan to yours.
Does not your plan involve a larger expenditure of time
and money than mine?
Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?
Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than
mine?
Would it not be less valuable in that yours would not
break a great line of the enemy’s communications, while mine would?
McClellan
Finally
In case of disaster, would it not be more difficult to
retreat by your plan than mine?
McClellan’s answer:
Decisive victory
Shortest land route TO RICHMOND
Cut enemy’s LOC engage on ground of his choosing
Egress down Peninsula to Monroe
Lincoln reluctantly agrees
McClellan
9 March
Johnston
withdraws behind line of the
Rappahannock River
Makes
move to Urbana impracticable
McClellan occupies Centerville/Manassas
More “Quaker
Guns”
Evidence
of no more than 50,000
McClellan
embarrassed
McClellan
Army of the Potomac
12 divisions
Lincoln orders 4 corps without consulting McClellan
Politics
Officers factions
Senior-republican
Junior-McClellan-picked-Democrats
Senior officers given the corps
McDowell
Sumner
Heintzelman
Keyes
McClellan
McClellan
sticks to amphibious operation
New
target=FT. Monroe
Up the
peninsula between Charles and James Rivers
Lincoln
relieves McClelland from command of army
Concentrate
on AoP operations
Command
reverts to Lincoln/Stanton
McClellan
Serious
threat to the success of McClellan’s plan
McClellan
The
answer: a “cheese box on a shingle”
McClellan
Lincoln
concerned about safety of D.C.
McClellan
remiss in explaining
Troops
in the Valley
Warrenton/Manassas
D.C.
Takes
4,000 from D.C. to Manassas
Stanton
charges McClellan with disobeying an order
McDowell’s
corps detached
McClellan
McClellan
After
Malvern Hill
2 July
McClellan falls back on Harrison’s Landing on The James